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ABSTRACT
Man-At-The-End (MATE) attackers are almighty adversaries against
whom there exists no silver-bullet countermeasure. To raise the
bar, a wide range of protection measures were proposed in the
literature each of which adds resilience against certain attacks on
certain digital assets of a program. Intuitively, composing a set of
protections (rather than applying just one of them) can mitigate
a wider range of attacks and hence offer a higher level of secu-
rity. Despite the potential benefits, very limited research has been
done on the composition of protections. Naive compositions could
lead to conflicts which, in turn, limit the application of protections,
raise false alarms, and worse yet, yield corrupted binaries. More
importantly, inadequate compositions of such protections are not
tailored for the program at hand and thus the offered security and
performance are sub-optimal. In this paper, we first lay out a set of
generic constraints for a conflict-free composition of protections.
Then, we develop a composition framework based on a defense
graph in which nodes and edges capture protections, their relations,
and constraints. The conflicts problem together with optimization
requirements are then translated into a set of integer constraints.
We then use Integer Linear Programming (ILP) to handle conflicts
while optimizing for a higher security and lower overhead. To mea-
sure the overhead, we use a set of real-world programs (MiBench
dataset and open source games). Our evaluation results indicate
that our composition framework reduces the overhead by ≈ 39%
while maximizing the coverage. Moreover, our approach yields a
5-fold decrease in overhead compared to state-of-the-art heuristics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
MATE refers to a class of adversaries whose access to the soft-
ware execution environment allows them to monitor, subvert, and
tamper with any running program in that environment [25]. The
consequences of such actions could range from bypassing license
checks [4], cheating in online multi-player games [15], to compro-
mising critical infrastructures [23, 28]. With the pervasiveness of
software systems and the emergence of IoT in our daily life, the
need for protecting software integrity becomes a matter of physical
safety.
There exists no silver-bullet countermeasure against MATE at-
tackers. On the one hand, theoretically secure schemes such as in-
distinguishability obfuscation [16] are still considered to be imprac-
tical [6] for real-world software. On the other hand, practical protec-
tion measures can only raise the bar against attackers [2, 3, 5, 7, 11].
That is, given enough time, resources, equipment, and skills, attack-
ers eventually win [13]. However, for some use cases, practical hard-
ening measures can cause enough overhead for attackers such that
defeating the protection is no longer economically attractive [10].
In the past two decades, numerous protection schemes were pro-
posed in the literature. Each measure essentially aims at thwarting
a particular type of attack in protected programs. In other words,
they add integrity protections on certain assets whereby mounting
certain attacks becomes relatively harder (as opposed to no applied
protection). These assets include, but not limited to, program’s code
(logic), control flow, sensitive data (e.g. crypto-related keys), etc. [3].
Given the unlimited power of the MATE adversaries and the sever-
ity of compromises in any of the integrity assets, realizing a holistic
protection with a higher coverage of different MATE attacks, is
compelling.
One way to achieve a higher degree of resilience against a wider
range of attacks is to utilize a multitude of protections simulta-
neously. We refer to this process as composition of protections in
the remainder of this paper. Composing protections not only mit-
igates more attacks but also forms multi-layer defenses, which
protect each other and are hence harder to be defeated by perpe-
trators. However, due to the brittle nature of integrity protection
schemes, composing such protections is an open problem in liter-
ature. On the one hand, composing oblivious hashing (OH) [12]
and self-checksumming (SC) [5] could lead to a cyclic dependency
between the two and ultimately could produce faulty binaries (we
discuss different conflicts in detail later in Section 3). On the other
hand, non-cyclic dependencies are desired because code segments
that are directly and/or indirectly checked (protected) by multiple
integrity checks are more resilient to code patching attacks. Fur-
thermore, protections have different capabilities when it comes to
protecting program assets. For instance, OH is unable to protect
nondeterministic program segments, while SC does not have such
a restriction [2]. Moreover, the locality of the checks can have a
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huge impact on the imposed overhead [9]. Simply put, carrying
out expensive checks in frequently executed code segments can
induce large overheads. Therefore, deciding upon where and how
to apply different protections in the given program can severely
impact security and performance of the protected programs. To
sum it up, we believe composing a range of protection techniques
can strengthen the software resilience against MATE attackers.
Problem. Naively composing protections is ineffective and can
potentially lead to conflicts, which can severely limit the application
and coverage of protections.
Gaps. To the best of our knowledge (see Section 2), the gaps in
literature are:
• The potential conflicts arising from composing protection
schemes were not thoroughly studied;
• The reviewed literature makes conservative assumptions as
to whether protection schemes are composable or not, i.e.
conflicts are prevented by forbidding the composition rather
than handling them upon composition; and
• The existing compositions do not offer a concrete optimiza-
tionmethodology for better performance and securityw.r.t. the
program at hand.
Contributions. This paper closes the aforementioned gaps by:
• Identifying three representative types of conflicts in the in-
tegrity protection composition (see Section 3);
• Proposing a graph-based technique for protection composi-
tion, enabling the detection and handling of the conflicts at
the program level (see Section 4);
• Utilizing ILP to optimize the composition for better perfor-
mance and security w.r.t. the program at hand (see Section 4);
• Implementing the proposed technique as an (open source)
end-to-end framework for a conflict-free composition of
protection schemes (see Section 5);
• Empirically evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of the
proposed technique using a set of real-world programs (see
Section 6);
Section 7 describes threats to validity. Section 8 presents conclusions
and ideas for future work.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
This paper contributes to two areas: software protection composi-
tion and protection optimization. To introduce the area of software
protection, we first review a set of representative integrity pro-
tection techniques that not only motivate the whole idea of the
composition but are also used in our empirical evaluations.
2.1 Integrity Protection Schemes
2.1.1 Self-checksumming (SC). SC [5, 11, 17, 18, 22] operates by in-
jecting a set of guards that hash or checksum the desired (sensitive)
segments of program code in memory (at runtime) and verify that
the hashes match to expected values. Because the expected values
can only be known after compilation a set of placeholders are used
during compilation. An adjustment process is executed after com-
pilation, to patch the placeholders with the actual expected values.
Consequently, if perpetrators tamper with the program code, the
guards can detect them. Once inconsistencies are detected, a re-
sponse mechanism is triggered [25], e.g. by injecting a fault into the
stack that eventually causes a crash in the application. SC guards
can further be hardened interconnecting them such that they pro-
tect each other [11]. SC guards add atypical behavior to a program,
i.e. the self memory access, which exposes the guards to taint-based
attacks [27]. SC is also susceptible to the memory split attacks [32].
One advantage is that SC is capable of protecting any program
segment with no restriction whatsoever.
2.1.2 Oblivious Hashing (OH) and Short Range Oblivious Hashing
(SROH). OH computes hashes of the program’s execution trace
(including memory values), by incorporating the memory reference
of instructions at runtime [12] and subsequently verifying them
(i.e. matching them to expected values) at random intervals. One
way to adjust expected values is to resort to a technique similar to
the SC post-patching technique [2].
OH captures the effect of the program execution, not its actual
code and thus cannot be deceived by attacks such as the memory
split attack. However, OH can only be applied to deterministic
segments of a program, which are executed for any given input.
This restriction severely limits the application of OH to only small
parts of programs. SROH [2] partially removes this restriction by
extending the coverage of OH to constant data residing in nonde-
terministic branches as well as all the branching conditions. The
input-data-dependent instructions in a program cannot be covered
by SROH nonetheless.
2.1.3 Call Stack Integrity Verification (CSIV). CSIV aims to guard
the access to sensitive functions in a given program [7]. That is,
only authentic sequences of calls can reach such functions. Any
attempts to illegitimately jump to them triggers a response mecha-
nism. To do so, a shadow stack can be created in which all (or part
of) function calls on the path to sensitive functions are reflected
into a hash variable. This can be achieved in two steps: i) accu-
mulatively hashing random tokens [1] in functions leading to a
sensitive function; and ii) verifying the expected hashes in sensitive
functions. As opposed to SC and OH which protect the code bytes,
respectively execution memory, CSIV only protects the intended
control flow.
2.1.4 Code Mobility (CM). CM aims at thwarting reverse engineer-
ing by mitigating static and dynamic analyses [14]. It partitions a
given program into a client part and server part. CM moves the
sensitive code to the server section and places corresponding calls
to the server in the client. The server upon request delivers the
sensitive code in pieces. This limits the amount of the code that an
attacker can get access to at once. CM imposes a constant connec-
tion between client and server.
2.1.5 The Need for Obfuscation. When it comes to integrity pro-
tection schemes obfuscation is no longer an additional layer of
protection but a must. The reason being that protection guards are
commonly injected into programs by instrumentation techniques.
As a direct consequence, they end up having the same syntactical
resemblance. This makes them extremely vulnerable to pattern-
matching attacks. Plenty of proposed schemes unanimously agree
on the gravity of applying obfuscation to protections [3]. Theoreti-
cally speaking, applying obfuscation shall not cause a conflict in
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protections. However, the application of obfuscation in practice
could lead to failures, particularly in the adjustment processes (see
Section 3.1.3).
2.2 Composition of Protections
The problem of protection composition is comprised of two sub-
problems: (1) deciding on the order in which transformations shall
be applied and (2) deciding upon which program segments shall be
protected with which protections to avoid conflicts while maximizing
security and minimizing the cost. We discuss each of these problems
in the following paragraphs.
Computing the optimal order of protections is equivalent to the
problem of phase ordering in optimizing compilers and hence is
undecidable [30]. Since the amenability of protection to each other
can be known upfront, we need not to compute an optimal order of
protections. Instead, we resort to a set of heuristics as we discuss
in Section 4.8.
The problem of applying which protections on which segments
of the given program was studied in the context of software obfus-
cation. Heffner et al. [21] proposed a technique for composing ob-
fuscation transformation by encoding dependency relations among
transformations in a probabilistic Finite State Automaton (FSA). The
probabilities capture different metrics as to which obfuscation is
more desired to be applied. The composition is then achieved by
a random walk on the FSA. Similarly, Liu et al. [24] presented a
technique that uses an iterative search-based algorithm to identify
an optimal sequence of obfuscations over particular partitions of a
given program. Guelton et al. [19] identified a set of arising conflicts
amongst obfuscations provided in two open source engines (namely
Tigress and O-LLVM) and clang optimization passes. Su et al. [29]
proposed the design of a composition technique using Petri nets and
inhibitor arcs to compute a sequence in which protections should
be applied, in order to avoid conflicts, to a program. However, as we
show in this paper the type of conflicts and metrics presented for
obfuscation are not transferable to the software integrity protection
composition problem.
ASPIRE project (https://aspire-fp7.eu/) is a framework that en-
ables chaining of integrity protection techniques. Nonetheless, not
all of the protections can be composed due to the potential rise
of conflicts [33]. For instance, in their tool chain, code mobility
and static remote-attestation shall not be utilized simultaneously.
Such preventions are hard coded in the framework within the tool
configurations. In this work, we aim to utilize potentially conflict-
ing protections at the same time by detecting and further handling
such conflicts. Furthermore, we optimize both conflict handling,
i.e. the decision on which protection shall be removed from a con-
flicting segment, and locality of protections in the program for
better performance and security (coverage) of a protected program.
To achieve these goals, we model our composition problem as a
graph problem and subsequently use ILP to optimally solve it. Our
transition from expressing nodes and their relations in a graph to
an ILP problem is inspired by the techniques introduced by Boulle
et al. [8] and Wrighton et al. [31].
2.3 Protection Optimization
2.3.1 Performance (Overhead). The locality of the guards that carry
out the checks plays an important role in the imposed overhead.
That is, if guards are placed in very frequently executed code (also
called “hot code”), e.g. code inside nested loops, the overhead is
potentially high. Cappert et al. [9] proposed a metric to measure
the hotness of a function based on its call frequency captured in a
dynamic profiling analysis. In their protection, they favor colder
functions as checkers in an attempt to induce less overhead. In
this work, we analyze code hotness at a lower level, namely basic
blocks, along with other factors to optimize the locality of checkers
of different types.
2.3.2 Security (Coverage). An important metric in measuring the
security of protection schemes is their connectivity [13, 17, 18]
that captures the number of unique guards that protect a particu-
lar program element (instruction, basic blocks, function, etc). Un-
derstandably, achieving higher connectivity entails having more
guards which (in-)directly check other guards, yielding larger over-
heads. In this work, we aim at reaching a desired connectivity level,
while minimizing the overhead. Since composed protections can
potentially protect each others’ guards, we propose a new metric
as implicit coverage that captures the program elements guards of
which are protected by other guards, i.e. indirect checking.
3 REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Conflict Detection
To understand the arising conflicts when combining protections, we
attempted to apply the protection schemes described in Section 2.1,
in various orders on a representative dataset of programs. In this
section, we briefly report on the conflicts that we encountered in
our naive composition attempts. From the identified conflicts we
then derive a set of requirements for our composition framework.
3.1.1 OH and SC. Both OH and SC use the concept of hashing
and verification. OH hashes memory references, while SC hashes
the process memory corresponding to a range of instructions, ba-
sic blocks or functions, at runtime. One can apply each of these
schemes once or multiple times in arbitrary orders. Both schemes
require a finalization step (post-patching) in which the expected
hash values are adjusted in the protected binary. When OH and
SC protected segments cyclically overlap, the adjustment of OH
hashes invalidates previously computed SC hashes and vice versa.
Consequently, binaries containing such conflicts would trigger false
tamper-detection alarms. This conflict in essence can occur between
any pair of overlapping schemes that rely on a post-patching step.
One solution for this conflict is to resort to cross-protection place-
holders (pivot bytes) like those presented in [5] to adjust values
without invalidating others. However, the pivot bytes themselves
can not be protected by any of the composed protections and thus
they remain at risk of tampering attacks. Alternatively, we could
keep cycles intact by resorting to commutative (reversible) hash
functions, which are intuitively easier to be defeated by attack-
ers. Therefore, we rather want to detect and subsequently prevent
such cyclic conflicts in our composition. Simply put, deterministic
finalization order is the first requirement of our system.
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3.1.2 SC/OH and CM. Chaining CM with SC yields a different
kind of conflict. CM mobilizes protected functions to a server from
which they are retrieved only when needed and cached in a random
memory address, such that the attacker does not know where to
find the function. Since the actual location of the mobilized func-
tions shall be unpredictable, SC guards will be unable to find such
functions at runtime, hence SC cannot protect CM protected func-
tions. To avoid this type of conflict, SC needs to mark protectee
segments in the code such that they cannot be removed from the
code by the CM protection. Conflicts of such can be detected by
safely tracing reference changes. Unlike SC, OH needs not to know
the address of mobilized functions. Applying CM on OH-protected
functions as well as the inverse case impose no conflicts.
3.1.3 Obfuscation and SC/OH. Obfuscation protects the confiden-
tiality of data, logic and the location of code in many protection
schemes. Without obfuscation plenty of protection measures can
readily be defeated by pattern matching. Obfuscation can conflict
with protections, too. If it is applied after inserting the SC and/or
OH guards, but before the final adjustments (when SC and/or OH
are utilized), it may change the resemblance of placeholders intro-
ducing faults in post-patching steps. If obfuscation is applied after
final adjustments, it can break SC checks as hash and length of ob-
fuscated blocks may differ from what SC guards expect. Syntactical
changes of basic blocks, their location, and lengths cause conflicts
in composition of obfuscation with schemes that rely on syntactical
values. In our system, we are in need of a safe value change tracing
mechanism to prevent such conflicts. In other words, we need to
mark certain pieces of code as unobfuscatable.
It is worthwhile to state that the identified conflicts are a com-
plete set of possible conflicts for the given set of protections. That
is, any other composition of the mentioned protections does not
cause conflicts.
4 DESIGN
4.1 Running Example
To illustrate our design and improve readability, we use a fictional
vehicle mileage counter program (Listing 1) as our running example
throughout this section. The program has two global variables:
RotationCount and MILEAGE. The onWheelRotationCompleted
function is an event handler that is triggered on every complete
wheel rotation. After 100 rotations, a mile is added to the car’s
mileage counter, which is an increase-only variable. The MILEAGE is
merely altered in the incrementMileage function. In this example
perpetrators aim to undermine the integrity of the mileage counter.
4.2 High level Process
To achieve low coupling amongst the different protections and
the composition transformation, each protection transformation
stays completely unaware of the composition taking place in the
framework. However, we do not want protection transformations
altering the program-to-protect in one go, because conflicts might
need to be settled before actually applying protections. To achieve
this goal, we refactor transformations into two-step transformations.
In the first step, the transformation generates a set of proposals as
to which segments it can protect in the given program (regardless
Listing 1: Fictional car mileage counter program
1 int RotationCount = 0, MILEAGE = 0;
2 void onWheelRotationCompleted() {
3 RotationCount += 1;
4 if (RotationCount >= 100) {
5 incrementMilage() ;
6 RotationCount = 0;
7 }
8 }
9 int incrementMileage() {
10 MILEAGE += 1;
11 return MILEAGE;
12 }
Listing 2: Protected fictional car mileage counter program,
note that all protections are applied at the LLVM IR level,
however for the sake of simplicity our snippet is presented
at the source code level
1 int RotationCount, MILEAGE = 0;
2 long G = <random token>; //OH hash variable
3 void onWheelRotationCompleted(){
4 long h1 = <random token>;
5 // overlapping SC and OH protection
6 long computedSCHash=
7 SC_hash(t=<AddIncrementMileage>,OH_hash(G,t), t),
8 ( t=<SizeIncrementMileage>, OH_hash(G,t),t ) ;
9 // overlapping SC and OH protection
10 SC_verify(computedSCHash, (t=<expected_SC_value>, OH_hash(G,t), t) ) ;
11 RotationCount += ( t=1, OH_hash(G,t),t ) ;
12 if ( t= RotationCount >= 100, SROH_hash(h1,t),t ) {
13 CSIV_Register () ;
14 m = milageIncrement() ;
15 RotationCount = ( t=0, SROH_hash(h1,t),t ) ;
16 SROH_verify(h1, <expected_h1_value>);
17 }
18 }
19 int incrementMileage() {
20 CSIV_Register () ;
21 CSIV_Verify () ; // Sensitive funcions include a control flow verification
22 MILEAGE += (t=1,OH_hash(G,t),t);
23 OH_verify(G,<expected_oh_value>);
24 G = <token> // the same token as in line 2
25 return MILEAGE;
26 }
of other protections that might be part of the composition). Addi-
tionally, each protection submits a set of constraints (Section 4.4)
defining under which assumptions the protection will function
properly. The second step, carries out the transformation for the
requested proposals on demand. In order to be composable, all the
protections need to be refactored to comply with this two-step
transformation requirement.
Our composition framework executes the first step of protection
transformations and collects their protection proposals as well as
their constraints. The collected proposals and constraints are then
merged to form protection manifests (Section 4.3). Subsequently, the
createdmanifests are projected on a defense graph (Section 4.5) upon
which conflict analysis (Section 4.6) and optimizations (Section 4.7)
are performed.
A possible outcome of applying SC, SROH, and CSIV protections
on the running example is illustrated in Listing 2. In the following
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m1: SC
P: increamentMileage()
C: 
1. onWheelRotation() depends on 
increamentMileage()
2. incrementMileage() is present
3. Address(incrementMileage) and 
Size(incrementMileage) are 
preserved
m2: OH-hash0
P: Address(incrementMileage)
C: 
1. G depends on 
Address(incrementMileage)
2. G depends on OH-hash(...)
m3: OH-hash1
P: Size(incrementMileage)
C: 
1. G depends on 
Size(incrementMileage)
2. G depends on OH-hash(...)
m11: OH-hash4
P: MILEAGE+=1
C: 
1. G depends on +=1
2. G depends on OH-hash(...)
m4: OH-hash2
P: expected-SC-value
C: 
1. G depends on expected-SC-value
2. G depends on OH-hash(...)
m5: OH-hash3
P: RotationCount+=1
C: 
1. G depends on +=1
2. G depends on OH-hash(...)
m9: OH-verify (also m12)
C: 
1. oh-verify(...) depends on G
2. oh-verify(…) depends on 
expectedOHValue
3. oh-verify(…) present at least 
one of OH-hash0..OH-hash4
4. expected-oh-value is preserved
m6: SROH-hash0
P: RotationCount >= 100
C: 
1. h1 depends on RotationCount 
>= 100
2. h1 depends on SROH-hash(...)
m7: SROH-hash1
P: RotationCount = 0
C: 
1. h1 depends on RotationCount=0 
2. h1 depends on SROH-hash(...)
m8: SROH-verify
C: 
1. sroh-verify(...) depends on 
RotationCount=0
2. oh-verify(…) depends on 
RotationCount >= 100
3. oh-verify(…) present at least 
one of SROH-hash0..SROH-hash1
4. expected-h1-value is preserved
m0: CSIV0
P: onWheelRotation()
m10: CSIV1
P: incrementMileage()
Figure 1: Generated protection manifests for the example
program; P and C refer to protected segments (instruction/-
function) and constraints, respectively
sections we will explain how this outcome has been obtained using
our composition framework.
4.3 Protection Manifest
A Protection Manifest is a data structure comprising of a protection
guard, a set of instructions protected by that guard, and constraints
under which the protection behaves as intended. Simply put, mani-
fests reflect how and where the protection is going to be applied on
the code. Each protection technique like SC, OH/SROH, and CSIV
proposes a multitude of manifests in the first step of a two-step
transformation.
Figure 1 depicts 12 protection manifests output by our approach
on the running example from Listing 1. Note that manifest m12
is the same as manifest m9, but they are placed in different func-
tions. The name of each manifest includes the protection technique
acronym and optionally an appended ordinal number for the sake
of unique names. Inside the rectables representing manifests we
see one or more lines prefixed by “P”(indicating the protected in-
structions) and/or “C” (indicating the constraints, described in Sec-
tion 4.4). SC and CSIV protections create stand-alone manifests,
while OH and SROH protections represent each guard as a depen-
dent pair of hash and verify manifests. The verify manifests do not
contain any “P”, just “C”, because they are verifying the “P” from
hash manifests. This split of verify and hash manifests, facilitates
the cyclic dependency analysis of manifests. Each manifest keeps a
reference to the protection instructions, which are not included in
Figure 1 due to space limitations. As a direct consequence, our com-
position framework, can easily decide to drop a manifest (e.g. due
to an arising conflict) resulting in the removal of the corresponding
guard instructions.
4.4 Constraints
As pointed out earlier, different protections can be applied individ-
ually to a program. However, each technique may yield different
types of conflicts, if composed. To be able to cope with those con-
flicts, we resort to a set of protection constraints, which are bundled
up in the manifests (indicated by “C:” in Figure 1). Constraints are
a set of rules that each protection scheme adds to their manifests.
That is, protections will work as intended if and only if all the con-
straints are satisfied throughout the composition process. Having
protection schemes specifying constraints in their manifests yields
better encapsulation as the composition itself need not to hold any
scheme related knowledge.
In our framework, we define three types of constraints, which
directly correspond to the three requirements introduced in Sec-
tion 3.1:
(1) Order constraints between manifestmA, and manifestmB , de-
note thatmA can only be finalized aftermB . For example, in the
m1:SC manifest from Figure 1, c1 indicates that onWheelRotation
depends on incrementMileage and therefore the latter has to be
finalized before. In a broader sense, we use the order constraints to
capture dependency relationships between protection and program
instructions. OH/SROH hash manifests use the very constraint to
capture the dependency of their hash variables to hashed instruc-
tions.
(2) Preserve constraints indicate that the value of certain marked
instructions shall not change. As depicted in Figure 1 preserve con-
straints are used by both SC and OH/SROH verify manifests to
mark their placeholders as unmodifiable.
(3) Present constraints betweenmA andmB denotes thatmA can
only exist ifmB is present in the program. SC manifests mark their
protectee functions with the present constraint so they stay in the
binary, e.g. incrementMileage is marked with such constraint in
our example. We use another variation of the present constraint
to capture the relation between split OH/SROH hash and verify
manifests. Hashes that are not verified are effectively useless as
they add no protection. To prevent the existence of hash manifests
without the corresponding verify manifests, we use present con-
straints such that verification manifests have to choose n ≥ 1 out
of the total number of relevant hash manifests.
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4.5 Defense Graph
To enable automated composition of protections, we first need an ab-
stract representation of: protection guards, protected segments, and
the overlaps between protections. Casting protection guards, their
corresponding protectees, and constraints into a unified represen-
tation aids detection of conflicts. Moreover, such a representation
supports reasoning about the resilience of the composed protec-
tions, for instance, by measuring the number of guards that protect
other guards. Additionally, the representation needs to be flexi-
ble enough to accommodate further information about program at
hand. Profiling information about program basic blocks can support
optimization decisions regarding the location of protection guards.
We propose to use a graph-based representation as it effectively
meets all our needs. The composition pass populates the graph
from the proposed manifests and protection protectee relations
between program sub-structures and protections. Since protections
are applied at different level of granularity (e.g. SC is applied at
the function level, while OH/SROH is employed at the instruction
level) graph nodes can refer to functions, instructions, or manifests.
Solid black arcs represent dependency (order) constraints. Dashed
arcs represent present contraints over multiple elements, i.e. con-
straints comprised of two or more elements are translated to arcs
between their corresponding nodes in the graph.Whilst, constraints
over single elements (namely preserve and present constraints) are
added to their corresponding nodes as attributes. It is important to
bear in mind that constraints are transitive. That is, if a function
has incoming/outgoing arcs, all of its instructions will inherit the
same relation (arcs). Figure 2 depicts a simplified graph for the
running example. The gray arcs capture the transitive arcs, i.e. in-
herited dependency relations from functions to their instructions.
For the sake of brevity, we omitted arcs that are deemed to be less
interesting. As illustrated in the figure the SC manifest leverages
from an additional protection by three OH hash manifests (namely
OH_hash0, OH_hash1, and OH_hash2).
We extend our graph nodes with a set of properties to accommo-
date for all the necessary meta data. For example, <ExecFreq(N)>
where N refers to the execution frequency of the block in which
the manifest resides. We collect such data by profiling binaries and
subsequently normalizing them.
4.6 Conflicts and Conflict Handling
Depending on the way that manifests are composed, order and/or
present constraints may hold true or false values. When these types
of constrains are false, the corresponding manifests are not ap-
plied for protecting the program. However, preserve constraints
must conserve segments from modifications, which is important to
be honored by the obfuscation passes. Therefore, no selection of
manifests violates preserve constraints. Manifests carrying present
constraints can only be selected if and only if their required mani-
fests are selected as well.
Honoring order constraints requires a delicate detection tech-
nique as a set of order constraints can collectively result in ambi-
guities. For example, assume the defense graph:mA →mB →mC
→mA, where→ denotes the order constraint indicating that the
left-hand manifest must be applied before the right-hand manifest.
In the this example, a cyclic dependency materializes that renders
incrementMileage
<Present>
onWheelRotation
m1: SC
e0
m2: OH_hash0
Address(IncrementMileage)
<Preserved><ExecFreq(100)>
m3: OH_hash1
Size(IncrementMileage)
<Preserved><ExecFreq(100)>
m4: OH_hash2
ExpectedSCValue
<Preserved><ExecFreq(100)>
G
m12: OH_verify1
<ExecFreq(1)>
m5: OH_hash3
RotationCount+=1
<ExecFreq(100)>
m11: OH_hash4
MILEAGE+=1
<ExecFreq(1)>
m6: SROH_hash0
RotationCount >= 100
<ExecFreq(100)>
m7: SROH_hash1
RotationCount = 0
<ExecFreq(1)>
h1
e1
m8: SROH_verify
<ExecFreq(1)>
 *..1
`
*..1
m9: OH_verify0
<ExecFreq(100)>
*..1
m10: CSIV1
<ExecFreq(1)>
m0: CSIV0
<ExecFreq(100)>
Figure 2: Defense graph for the manifests of the exam-
ple program; node attributes are depicted in the form of
<Attribute>; Manifests are shown as sharp-edged rectangles
while program instructions (G and h1) are shown as round-
edged rectangles.
the finalization order of the manifests impossible. That is, finalizing
in any order results in invalidation of already finalized nodes. In
the defense graph from Figure 2, the transitive edge e0 together
with e1 form a cycle. Our strategy is to break cycles by removing
one or more manifests in the cycle. However, our framework needs
to detect cycles in the first place. To efficiently detect cycles in the
defense graph, we utilize the strongly connected component (SCC)
analysis proposed by Nuutila [26]. After cycle detection, there is
more than one solution to the manifest removal problem. One out of
all the manifests contributing to a cycle may randomly be removed,
which would break the cycle. Since manifests in the graph corre-
spond to protection mechanisms, the decision as to which manifest
shall be removed entails different security and performance trade-
offs. To balance those trade-offs, we are in need of a set of security
as well as performance metrics. Therefore, we resort to a set of
metrics to measure the impact of each manifest on the security and
performance overhead. To find an optimal solution, we employ ILP
to handle conflicts as described in Section 4.7.
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4.7 Optimization
Our goal is to minimize the overhead of protections while attaining
a set of security requirements (i.e. explicit and implicit coverage of
protections). Running protection passes yields a set of candidate
manifests,Mcandidates : {m0,m1, ...,mn }, where n corresponds to
the total number of protection manifests, andmi ∈ {0, 1} for 0 ≤
i ≤ n. Precisely put, our goal is to select a subset of manifests, i.e. a
concrete assignment of eachmi ∈ Mcandidates , which satisfies our
security requirements with the minimum possible overhead.
4.7.1 Security Requirements. For every manifest, the composition
pass calculates the values for the following metrics: (1) explicit
instruction coverage, which measures the instructions explicitly
protected by manifests and (2) explicit block coverage, which mea-
sures the basic blocks explicitly protected by manifests. Thereupon,
desired security constraints can be written in the form of inequal-
ities:
∑n
i=1 Pjmi ≥ D j or
∑n
i=1 Pjmi ≤ D j , where 0 ≤ j ≤ p; p,
Pj , and D j correspond to the total number of scores computed
for manifests, the jth score of a manifest, and the desired value
for the score of interest, respectively. For example, m1:SC will be
assigned with explicit instruction coverage of 6 (lines of code in
incrementMileage), and explicit block coverage of 1 (there is only
one basic block in incrementMileage). This generic inequality can
be used to have constraints over any metric value of manifests, ex-
cept for the implicit coverage metrics (both block and instruction).
Implicit coverage rather depends on two (or more) manifests: a
protector and a protectee. Therefore, it is impossible to measure the
implicit coverage of a manifest without prior knowledge of other
selected manifests in the solution. For instance, m2, m3, and m4
are implicitly protecting the incrementMileage function as they
protect the guard (m1:SC) that is protecting that function. However,
their implicit coverage is equivalent to the explicit coverage of m1
if and only if m1 is selected in the final solution, otherwise it is 0.
Furthermore, there could exist multiple arcs implicitly protecting
the same set of instructions. For example, there are three OH hash
manifests (m2, m3 and m4) that are implicitly protecting m1. To pre-
cisely calculate the implicit coverage, we need to detect duplicates
and subsequently consider them in our computation.
To detect duplicates, we introduce two sets of binary auxiliary
variables: ei, j and f0, ..., fn , where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n and n corresponds to
the total number of manifests. Every ei, j ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether
there exists an arc betweenmi andmj in the defense graph or not.
It is important to note that an arc (ei, j ) can only exist if and only if
both of its manifests (mi andmj ) are present in the solution. We
formulate the desired relation by introducing a constraint such
as 0 ≤ mi + mj − 2ei, j ≤ 1 for all arcs. To deal with possible
duplicate arcs, we ensure that every manifest’s implicit coverage is
counted only once for all the duplicate arcs. For this purpose, we
first constrain auxiliary variables fi as a disjunction of arcs tomi ,
i.e. Ei = {ej,k |i = k}, 0 ≤ |Ei | × fi −
∑Ei
c=ej,i c ≤ 1. Note that Ei is a
list capturing all arcs ending inmi (sink). In our runinng example,
form1 three duplicate arcs exist: e2,1, e3,1 and e4,1, which are not
visible in Figure 2, becausem2,m3 andm4 protectm1’s guard code.
This yields a constraint such as 0 ≤ 3 × f1 − e2,1 − e3,1 − e4,1 ≤ 1.
Subsequently, for a precise calculation we use fi asmi ’s coefficient
for the implicit coverage, i.e.
∑n
0 fi × implicit(mi ) ≤ K . Note that
the implicit(mi ) function can either return the size of implicitly
protected instructions or blocks bymi . At this point we can compute
solutionswith the desired implicit coverage by settingK to the value
of interest.
4.7.2 Conflict Constraints. We formulate our 3 protection con-
straints in the form of inequalities. To break a cycle, an arc, from
the set of arcs taking part in the cycle, needs to be removed. We can
formulate this as
∑C
i=1mi ≤ C − 1, where C denotes the count of
manifests in a cycle. In our example, m1, G, and m12 form a cyclic con-
flict. A corresponding avoid-cycle constraint will limit the solver’s
choice to either of m1 or m12manifests. Since the objective function
is subject to other security as well as performance constraints, the
manifest with the least contribution to the desired properties will
be removed.
For every set of manifests that form a cycle, we add the afore
mentioned conflict constraint to the set. Since the SCC analysis
may fail to detect all cycles, we reanalyze the outcome of the opti-
mization to identify further (sub-)cycles. All the newly identified
cycles are repeatedly added as constraints to the system till no more
cycles are detected.
For present constraints, we add a constraintmi ≤ mj , where i
is the index of the manifest that cannot exist without the manifest
at the index j. It turns out that preserve constraints do not impose
any limitations on the choice of manifests as they are rather restric-
tions on the utilization of obfuscation on preserved placeholders.
Therefore, we exclude them from our optimization process.
4.8 Order of Protections
Some protections can protect the guards of other protections. In
such cases, a layered protection is recommended. The instructions
explicitly protected by the protectee guards are implicitly protected
by the protector guards. To defeat such chained guards, attackers
may need to find and disable various guards of different types,
which intuitively hardens the composed protection. Such chains
of protections can only materialize when protections are applied
in particular orders. Therefore, the order in which protections are
applied is important.
We believe OH shall be applied after SC as SC guards can ben-
efit from the additional protections of OH [2]. Both SC and OH
can protect CSIV guards, while only OH can cover CM protected
functions. Precisely put, the order of protection is SC→ OH/SROH
→ CSIV→ CM. It is worth noting that all obfuscations should be
applied after integrity protection passes, but before finalizations,
to maximize their coverage over integrity protection guards.
An interesting take is that protections can be applied multiple
times. In such cases, guards can potentially have a higher number
of overlaps. Although our design supports a multiple application
of schemes, we consider it out of the scope of this paper.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
All the mentioned protection schemes have an LLVM-based open
source implementation. For compatibility and portability reasons,
we also decided to develop our composition framework in LLVM.
Our entire tool chain is open source (see Section 9).
Figure 3 illustrates the modules in our framework along with
their relation to protection and LLVM modules. The green boxes
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indicate the newly developed modules in the the system. Our op-
timizations are implemented as LLVM transformation modules.
Protection passes (CSIV, CM, SC, and OH/SROH) are first executed
which results in a set of manifests. The existing protection passes
(CSIV, CM, SC, and OH/SROH) were re-factored to to support the
two-step transformation according to Section 4.2. It is worthwhile
to mention that supporting further protections in our framework
is rather straightforward. To do so, a protection pass needs to be
refactored to conform to our framework’s two-step propose and
apply interfaces.
The composition pass collects the generated manifests from
which it populates a defense graph. We use the lemon graph library
(https://lemon.cs.elte.hu), due to its performance and flexibility, to
build our defense graph with specialized arcs and nodes. Thereafter,
a set of ILP constraints from present and order manifest-constraints
are generated. Further security requirements are also added to the
problem space in the form of integer linear constraints. We use glpk
library (https://www.gnu.org/software/glpk/) to solve the linear
problem. Once the optimal solution is found (if security constraints
are satisfiable), a conflict handling pass is engaged that remove all
the manifests which are not selected by the solver. The last step is
to define the finalization order of the manifests. This is important
as the correctness of the post patching step relies on this order. In
our framework we unified the adjustment step to follow the reverse
topological patching order to avoid inconsistencies in placeholders.
6 EVALUATION
In our evaluation, we run experiments to measure the security
as well as performance of our composition. For performance, we
benchmark the protection overhead for different coverage levels.
Moreover, we conduct an experiment in which we compare our
composition optimization to a benchmark in the literature. Regard-
ing security, we measure protection coverage and we perform a
threat analysis using attack trees.
6.1 Dataset
To evaluate effectiveness and efficiency of our solution, we carry
out a set of empirical experiments on a dataset comprised of 25 real-
world programs; 22 of these programs are taken from the MiBench
dataset [20], which is a representative embedded benchmark com-
prised of 33 programs. It is worthwhile to mention that we cannot
benchmark 11 out of the 33 programs from MiBench 10 of which
is due to failures and extremely slow computations in the external
pointer analysis library that SROH scheme uses [2]. The 11th pro-
gram (i.e. ispell) appears to be faulty [2]. The other three programs
in our dataset are open-source games snake (https://github.com/
troglobit/snake), tetris (https://github.com/troglobit/tetris) and
2048 (https://github.com/cuadue/2048_game) taken from GitHub.
Generating protected instances for six particular programs, namely
cjpeg, djpeg, say, susan, tetris and toast, forced us to adopt a
different tool. The solver that we use in our toolchain (i.e. glpk)
takes more than 5 minutes to find solutions for some problems. It
becomes problematic when programs contain a large number of
conflicting manifests due to subcycles. In such cases the compo-
sition is repeated until no cycles are detected. For the mentioned
programs the number of cycles (and subcycles) and thus the repeti-
tions exceeds 1000 times, which makes it impractical to generate all
binaries. To cope with this problem, in the generation of protected
instances of the aforementioned programs, we utilize the commer-
cial Gurobi solver (http://www.gurobi.com/) under a free academic
license.
6.2 Configuration of Testbed
All performance measurements are recorded on a machine with
an Intel i7-6700k processor and 32 GB of memory running the
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS operating system. For all the experiments, we
use constant parameters for the SC pass (connectivity=1) and default
parameters for other protections, namely OH, SROH, CSIV and CM.
6.3 Coverage Optimization
In this evaluation we intend to measure the effectiveness of our ILP-
based optimization on the coverage of the composition. The goal is
to achieve higher coverage results with lower overheads. For this
purpose, we base our analysis on two types of coverage, namely
explicit and implicit. The former captures the ratio of protected
instructions by the composed protections. The latter, however, rep-
resents the ratio of protected instructions, the guards of which are
also protected by other guard(s). Since there exist no benchmark of
the composition of our protections of interest (i.e. SC, CSIV, OH/S-
ROH, CM), we build a baseline from our dataset. For this purpose,
we use the maximum possible manifests as the baseline of our evalu-
ation. In this mode, the composition is steered to select all manifests
that yield no conflicts in the programs. We then collect the explicit
and implicit coverage values achieved by the composition for every
program in the the dataset. These values capture the maximum
attainable coverages. Subsequently, we feed those coverage values
as constraints (requirements) and set the solver to find solutions
with (possibly) lower overheads.
Table 1 presents the experiment results; LLVM Inst. count, Mani-
fest all, Explicit, and Implicit, Overhead% median,Manifest after, and
Decrease% median columns denote number of program instructions
in LLVM IR, maximum number of applicable manifests, explicit
instruction coverage, implicit instruction coverage, median of the
actual overhead (after execution), number of manifests after op-
timization, and percentage of the decrease over the median, re-
spectively. It is worthwhile to mention that the implicit/explicit
instruction coverage may be larger than the total number of instruc-
tions. This is due to the fact that we include protection instructions
(guards) in our coverage calculations.
The five columns following the program name column capture
the results of the maximum manifest protection (i.e. the baseline).
The other three columns starting from the Manifest after capture
the results corresponding to the ILP optimization aiming for mini-
mizing the overhead while attaining the same explicit and implicit
coverages as the baseline (maximum security).
Our experiments indicate that our optimization yields an over-
head decrease of 38.9% on average.
6.4 Performance
In the performance evaluations, we are interested in measuring
the performance improvements of the optimized composition as
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Figure 3: Module representation of our solution in LLVM framework; green boxes distinguish composition modules from
LLVM and protection modules.
opposed to no-optimizations. One way to conduct this experiment
is to use randomly selected manifests as a baseline. Our results
indicate that the presented optimization technique unsurprisingly
beats such a baseline. However, we believe random selection is
unrealistic. In practice, compositions rather use some heuristics [2].
In order to capture possible improvements, we resort to a heuristic-
based composition of SC and OH/SROH (presented in [2]) as our
baseline. Our aim is to measure the overhead difference between the
optimized composition versus the heuristic one. For this purpose,
similar to the previous experiment, we feed their coverage values as
constraints to our framework. Thereafter, we use the optimization
to minimize the overhead.
To obtain comparable results, we follow their partial protection
methodology in which combinations of 10%, 25%, 50%, and 100% are
protected. Each coverage level indicates the percentage of program
functions that must be protected by the composition framework.
To weed out the noise from our measurements, for each coverage
level we generate 20 random combinations of functions. Our setup
yields 4000 protected binaries in total, 2000 (= 25×4×20) protected
instances for the baseline and 2000 instances as the optimized-
protected binaries.
To measure runtime overheads, we run each instance 100 times
with the exact same input to the protected and unprotected in-
stances of a program. For the programs in which user input is
required, we pipe constant inputs by intercepting library/system
calls.
Figure 4 illustrates the average overhead of the composed protec-
tion for different coverage levels. The black-margined bars repre-
sent the average overhead induced by our composition optimization
technique. The gray-margined bars behind the black-margined bars,
represent the average overhead of the heuristic-based compositions.
Our results show that our technique on average induces 31.20%,
41.77%, 68.93% and 226.98% overhead for coverage levels of 10, 25,
50 and 100% as opposed to 86.53%, 166.85%, 351.48% and 1270.96%
(respectively) that is induced by the heuristic approach in [2]. Our
optimization yields a five-fold decrease in the overhead in the case
of 100% protection. It is noteworthy that our optimization fails to
outperform the heuristic approach for some programs (or cover-
age levels). Such cases indicate that there simply is no room for
improvements with the requested coverage constraints.
It is important to note that preventing conflicts was one of our
main goals in this work. Since a majority of conflicts yield cor-
rupted binaries, proper execution of the protected programs adds
confidence to the correctness of our approach. In our experiments
all the protected binaries executed correctly (i.e. no crashes or false
alarms were detected) for the given set of inputs.
6.5 Security Analysis
To evaluate the security of the composed protections, one has two
options: i) injecting random faults (tampering) and measuring de-
tection rates per each scheme; and ii) using attack-defense tree
notation to capture the steps that an attacker has to take in or-
der to defeat the protection. The assumption in the former is that
perpetrators have no knowledge about the protection measure.
Subsequently, the goal is to measure what ratio of the random at-
tacks can be detected, which is unrealistic due to 2 reasons. Firstly,
attackers do possess or acquire knowledge about the protection
techniques and thus random fault injection does not reflect the
behavior of attackers in real life, as indicated in user studies [10].
Secondly, coverage metrics capture the percentage of protected
instructions by each scheme. Simply put, we already know which
instructions are left unprotected or protected with weaker protec-
tions. Therefore, one can already know which random faults are
going to go unnoticed depending on the location where they are
injected.
For the sake of simplicity, in our security evaluation we use a
fictional program so-called cool that comes with a license check (LC)
function. The goal of the attacker is to use the program without
any usage limitations imposed by the LC. The cool program in
various execution traces consults the LC. Any suspicion to violation
of integrity, will be entertained with a stealthy program termination.
Now let us assume that the cool program is protected using our
protection composition framework. Figure 5 captures the steps that
an attacker needs to successfully undertake in order to defeat the
protected LC.
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qsort_s 92 37 143 133 117.38 29 107.29 8.59
crc 147 105 569 561 12101.88 100 11454.04 5.35
qsort_l 147 35 120 110 109.91 27 99.46 9.50
djkstra_l 323 376 1490 1480 10155.87 370 7733.33 23.85
djkstra_s 323 376 1490 1480 7424.65 370 3373.06 54.57
caudio 418 111 1578 1571 128.24 106 104.91 18.20
daudio 418 105 1556 1549 131.75 100 86.90 34.04
bm_s 532 384 1284 1216 484.69 353 190.75 60.64
tetris 629 847 761 539 861.10 280 94.41 89.04
bm_l 643 489 1395 1319 221.63 408 202.76 8.51
sha 657 1855 5752 5744 2581.26 1849 2401.35 6.97
bitcnts 664 157 1803 1793 1558.30 150 966.02 38.01
fft 742 431 2896 2885 2074.47 399 897.10 56.76
2048 749 677 3109 3094 345.51 592 288.95 16.37
srch_l 827 259 2254 2229 497.44 245 451.20 9.30
srch_s 827 259 2254 2229 203.45 245 97.69 51.98
snake 1065 1826 6726 6719 52.17 1815 49.57 4.99
patricia 1087 431 2827 2814 1290.82 297 812.04 37.09
bf 3607 280 5489 5471 1558.30 210 473.18 69.63
rijndael 5866 418 7292 7269 316.90 345 88.12 72.19
say 6859 28148 10020 7902 30536.44 2698 4593.18 84.96
susan 12656 101599 6315 5088 9634.79 1513 2933.76 69.55
toast 13930 91387 13294 11501 17598.29 2215 3344.37 81.00
djpeg 52708 4358 23055 0 11427.80 1533 8534.31 25.32
cjpeg 54837 4560 23109 0 17394.82 1507 11101.80 36.18
Mean 6430.12 9580.40 2289.26 2987.84 5152.31 710.24 2419.18 38.90
Median 742.00 418.00 1578.00 1793.00 1290.82 353.00 473.18 36.18
Std.Dev 14730.39 26786.87 1859.21 2960.85 7714.51 784.68 3546.48 28.04
Table 1: Overhead decrease of optimized solutions withmaximized attainable protections (explicit and implicit coverage) with
minimized overhead; columns 2-6 correspond to the maximum possible protection (applicable manifests) while columns 7-9
capture the results of optimized solutions
The root of the attack tree is defeat LC. Our attacker has 3 means
to achieve this goal: i) tamper with the LC code, e.g. to have a license
which is always valid; ii) tamper with the callsites (usages) of LC
function such that, for instance, they call a forged function instead
of LC; iii) subverting the program control flow to completely bypass
the LC. All three require the attacker to first identify the LC function
and/or its callsites in the protected program. The identification of
the LC can be hardened by utilizing obfuscation techniques such as
CM.
To tamper with the logic of LC, the attacker (in addition to find-
ing LC in the first place) may need to defeat SC and OH guards
protecting LC. This, however, requires to detect SC and OH guards
in the program. Since SC and OH guards are very amenable, it is
more difficult to tackle them one by one ( [2] discusses the diffi-
culty of this task in depth). These guards are further hardened by
obfuscation techniques that are applied on top of them.
Tampering with the LC callsites potentially includes detection
and disabling of OH/SROH/SC/CM protections in the program. The
detection is further hardened by means of applied obfuscations.
To protect the integrity of the control flow, our composition
utilizes CSIV protection. For an attacker to defeat the CSIV protec-
tion, it is first necessary to identify CSIV guards. Subsequently, the
attacker needs to defeat all the potential overlapping SC/OH/SRO-
H/CM protections.
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY
Although we have integrated the most representative integrity
protections in our framework, we may have overlooked some con-
flicting dependency between these protection schemes. Therefore,
we are only confident with the scope of the evaluated schemes.
Adding further constraints may be needed for full correctness. We
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Figure 4: Performance comparison of compositions of SC and OH/SROH using heuristic-based approach vs. our optimization
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Figure 5: Security analysis of the composed protection of SC,
OH/SROH, and CSIV using attack tree notation
believe the graph-based representation is sufficient for the detection
of conflicts between protection schemes.
The performance optimizations are based on the hotness of the
code blocks w.r.t. the constant inputs that were passed to the pro-
grams in the dataset. Further inputs, for instance, generated using
symbolic execution, can be generated for the programs in an effort
to visit more representative performance profile of the program
after protection.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Composing protections introduces layers of guards that if chosen
and placed wisely can form an interconnected network of protec-
tion. This forces attackers to defeat multiple types of protection to
mount their attacks, which adds more resilience to the entire pro-
tection. Conflicts amongst protection and catering for the program
at hand are two problems of the software protection composition.
In this work with the help of a defense graph and integer linear pro-
gramming, we presented a technique that not only handles conflicts
but also composes protections in a way that layered protections are
formed. We further optimized the protection w.r.t. the program at
hand for better performance and security. Our evaluation results on
a dataset of 25 real-world programs indicate that our composition
framework decreases the average overhead of selected composed
protections by 38.9% while providing the maximum security (cov-
erage). Furthermore, our approach yields a five-fold decrease on
the average overhead in comparison to the relevant heuristic-based
approach.
As future work, we plan to empirically measure the actual re-
silience of composed protections as compared to single-handed
protections. Based on the outcome of our empirical study, we aim
to come up with a set of metrics to quantify the resilience of protec-
tions. Importing further protection schemes and identifying further
constraints are also appealing.
9 AVAILABILITY
We made our composition framework1 along with all protection
passes, namely SC2, OH/SROH3, and CSIV4, and the interprocessor
dependency analyzer 5 open source. We also provide an artifact
repository with a reproducible setting via a docker file accessible
1https://github.com/mr-ma/composition-framework
2https://github.com/mr-ma/composition-self-checksumming
3https://github.com/mr-ma/composition-sip-oblivious-hashing
4https://github.com/mr-ma/composition-sip-control-flow-integrity
5https://github.com/mr-ma/composition-input-dependency-analyzer
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at https://github.com/mr-ma/sip-shaker-artifact/. All our bench-
marks are reproducible by means of one-step scripts provided in
our evaluation repository. As mentioned in Section 6.1 benchmark-
ing 6 particular programs needs the Gurobi solver. We provide a
comprehensive explanation as to how to generate those binaries in
the artifact repository.
REFERENCES
[1] Martín Abadi, Mihai Budiu, Ulfar Erlingsson, and Jay Ligatti. 2005. Control-flow
integrity. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communi-
cations security. ACM, 340–353.
[2] Mohsen Ahmadvand, Anahit Hayrapetyan, Sebastian Banescu, and Alexander
Pretschner. 2018. Practical Integrity Protection with Oblivious Hashing. In
Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC
’18). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 40–52. https://doi.org/10.1145/3274694.3274732
[3] Mohsen Ahmadvand, Alexander Pretschner, and Florian Kelbert. 2018. A Taxon-
omy of Software Integrity Protection Techniques. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.
1016/bs.adcom.2017.12.007
[4] David Aucsmith. 1996. Tamper resistant software: An implementation. In Inter-
national Workshop on Information Hiding. Springer, 317–333.
[5] Sebastian Banescu, Mohsen Ahmadvand, Alexander Pretschner, Robert Shield,
and Chris Hamilton. 2017. Detecting Patching of Executables without System
Calls. In CODASPY’17, Gail-Joon Ahn, Alexander Pretschner, and Gabriel Ghinita
(Eds.). The Association for Computing Machinery, 185–196. https://doi.org/10.
1145/3029806.3029835
[6] Sebastian Banescu, Martín Ochoa, Nils Kunze, and Alexander Pretschner. 2015.
Idea: Benchmarking indistinguishability obfuscation–a candidate implementa-
tion. In International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems.
Springer, 149–156.
[7] Sebastian Banescu, Alexander Pretschner, Dominic Battré, Stéfano Cazzulani,
Robert Shield, and Greg Thompson. 2015. Software-based protection against
changeware. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application
Security and Privacy. ACM, 231–242.
[8] Marc Boulle. 2004. Compact mathematical formulation for graph partitioning.
Optimization and Engineering 5, 3 (2004), 315–333.
[9] Jan Cappaert, Bart Preneel, Bertrand Anckaert, Matias Madou, and Koen De Boss-
chere. 2008. Towards tamper resistant code encryption: Practice and experi-
ence. In International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience.
Springer, 86–100.
[10] Mariano Ceccato, Paolo Tonella, Cataldo Basile, Bart Coppens, Bjorn De Sutter,
Paolo Falcarin, and Marco Torchiano. 2017. How professional hackers understand
protected code while performing attack tasks. In Program Comprehension (ICPC),
2017 IEEE/ACM 25th International Conference on. IEEE, 154–164.
[11] Hoi Chang and Mikhail J Atallah. 2001. Protecting software code by guards. In
ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management. Springer, 160–175.
[12] Yuqun Chen, Ramarathnam Venkatesan, Matthew Cary, Ruoming Pang, Saurabh
Sinha, and Mariusz H Jakubowski. 2002. Oblivious hashing: A stealthy software
integrity verification primitive. In International Workshop on Information Hiding.
Springer, 400–414.
[13] Nenad Dedić, Mariusz Jakubowski, and Ramarathnam Venkatesan. 2007. A
graph game model for software tamper protection. In International Workshop on
Information Hiding. Springer, 80–95.
[14] Paolo Falcarin, Stefano Di Carlo, Alessandro Cabutto, Nicola Garazzino, and
Davide Barberis. 2011. Exploiting code mobility for dynamic binary obfuscation.
In Internet Security (WorldCIS), 2011 World Congress on. IEEE, 114–120.
[15] Wu-chang Feng, Ed Kaiser, and Travis Schluessler. 2008. Stealth measurements
for cheat detection in on-line games. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGCOMM
Workshop on Network and System Support for Games. ACM, 15–20.
[16] Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, Mariana Raykova, Amit Sahai, and
Brent Waters. 2016. Candidate indistinguishability obfuscation and functional
encryption for all circuits. SIAM J. Comput. 45, 3 (2016), 882–929.
[17] Sudeep Ghosh, Jason Hiser, and Jack W Davidson. 2013. Software protection for
dynamically-generated code. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGPLAN Program
Protection and Reverse Engineering Workshop. ACM, 1.
[18] Sudeep Ghosh, Jason D Hiser, and Jack W Davidson. 2010. A secure and robust
approach to software tamper resistance. In International Workshop on Information
Hiding. Springer, 33–47.
[19] Serge Guelton, Adrien Guinet, Pierrick Brunet, Juan Manuel Martinez Caamaño,
Fabien Dagnat, and Nicolas Szlifierski. 2018. [Research Paper] Combining Obfus-
cation and Optimizations in the Real World. 2018 IEEE 18th International Working
Conference on Source Code Analysis and Manipulation (SCAM) (2018), 24–33.
[20] Matthew R Guthaus, Jeffrey S Ringenberg, Dan Ernst, Todd M Austin, Trevor
Mudge, and Richard B Brown. 2001. MiBench: A free, commercially representative
embedded benchmark suite. InWorkload Characterization, 2001. WWC-4. 2001
IEEE International Workshop on. IEEE, 3–14.
[21] Kelly Heffner and Christian Collberg. 2004. The obfuscation executive. In Inter-
national Conference on Information Security. Springer, 428–440.
[22] Pascal Junod, Julien Rinaldini, JohanWehrli, and Julie Michielin. 2015. Obfuscator-
LLVM: software protection for the masses. In Proceedings of the 1st International
Workshop on Software Protection. IEEE Press, 3–9.
[23] Stamatis Karnouskos. 2011. Stuxnet worm impact on industrial cyber-physical
system security. In IECON 2011-37th Annual Conference on IEEE Industrial Elec-
tronics Society. IEEE, 4490–4494.
[24] Han Liu, Chengnian Sun, Zhendong Su, Yu Jiang, Ming Gu, and Jiaguang Sun.
2017. Stochastic Optimization of Program Obfuscation. In Proceedings of the
39th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE ’17). IEEE Press,
Piscataway, NJ, USA, 221–231. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSE.2017.28
[25] Jasvir Nagra and Christian Collberg. 2009. Surreptitious Software: Obfuscation,
Watermarking, and Tamperproofing for Software Protection: Obfuscation, Water-
marking, and Tamperproofing for Software Protection. Pearson Education.
[26] Esko Nuutila and Eljas Soisalon-Soininen. 1994. On finding the strongly con-
nected components in a directed graph. Inf. Process. Lett. 49, 1 (1994), 9–14.
[27] Jing Qiu, Babak Yadegari, Brian Johannesmeyer, Saumya Debray, and Xiaohong
Su. 2015. Identifying and understanding self-checksumming defenses in software.
In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and
Privacy. ACM, 207–218.
[28] Bruce Schneier. 2007. Story of the Greek Wiretapping Scandal. (2007). https://
www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/07/story_of_the_gr_1.html https://www.
schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/07/story_of_the_gr_1.html/.
[29] Q. Su, F. He, N. Wu, and Z. Lin. 2018. A Method for Construction of Software
Protection Technology Application Sequence Based on Petri Net With Inhibitor
Arcs. IEEE Access 6 (2018), 11988–12000. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.
2812764
[30] Sid-Ahmed-Ali Touati and Denis Barthou. 2006. On the decidability of phase
ordering problem in optimizing compilation. In Proceedings of the 3rd conference
on Computing frontiers. ACM, 147–156.
[31] Michael G Wrighton and André M DeHon. 2006. SAT-based optimal hypergraph
partitioning with replication. In Proceedings of the 2006 Asia and South Pacific
Design Automation Conference. IEEE Press, 789–795.
[32] Glenn Wurster, Paul C Van Oorschot, and Anil Somayaji. 2005. A generic attack
on checksumming-based software tamper resistance. In Security and Privacy,
2005 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 127–138.
[33] Brecht Wyseur and Bjorn De Sutter. 2014. D1.04 Reference Ar-
chitecture. (2014). https://aspire-fp7.eu/sites/default/files/D1.
04-ASPIRE-Reference-Architecture-v2.1.pdf
